Code based access systems

ABSTRACT

A system including at least two parts or stations wherein a transaction or connection between any two or more of the parts or stations is conducted or established by means of an access code, the access code being available to an accessed part or station and requiring an identical access code to be provided to an accessing part or station at the time of conducting the transaction or establishing the connection. The system is characterized in that the access code is one of a plurality of codes provided to the accessed part or station and available to the accessing part or station. The system is further characterized in that the access code is selected from the plurality of codes at the time of conducting the transaction or establishing the connection, such that no two transactions are conducted or no two connections are established with the same access codes.

This application is a divisional application of U.S. application Ser.No. 11/853,327, filed Sep. 11, 2007, which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 11/025,864, filed Dec. 28, 2004, now U.S. Pat. No.7,267,268, which is a divisional application of U.S. application Ser.No. 09/250,340 filed Feb. 16, 1999.

FIELD OF THE INVENTIONS

The present invention relates to improvements in code based accesssystems.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTIONS

Systems in which transactions or connections between two or more partsor stations of the system are conducted or established by means of anaccess code are known. Such systems include computer terminals whereinthe access code is a password, bank terminals such as ATM machineswherein the access code is a personal identification number (PIN) andcommunications terminals such as mobile telephones wherein the accesscode is an electronic serial number (ESN). Typically the access code isprovided by a user to an accessing part or station of the system and isverified against a duplicate version of the access code available to anaccessed part or station of the system, before an authority to performthe transaction or to establish the connection between the stations orparts is given.

A disadvantage of such systems is that the security of futuretransactions or connections becomes seriously compromised if the accesscode is detected by or otherwise becomes known to unauthorized personsi.e. Persons other than the person or persons authorized to perform thetransactions or establish the connection.

An object of the present invention is to provide a code based accesssystem which alleviates the disadvantages of the prior art or at leastprovides the public with a choice.

To this end the present invention provides a system including at leasttwo parts or stations wherein a transaction or connection between anytwo or more of said parts or stations is conducted or established bymeans of an access code, said access code being available to an accessedpart or station and requiring an identical access code to be provided toan accessing part or station at the time of conducting the transactionor establishing the connection, wherein said access code is one of aplurality of codes provided to said accessed part or station andavailable to said accessing part or station, said access code beingselected from said plurality of codes at the time of conducting thetransaction or establishing the connection such that no two transactionsare conducted or no two connections are established with the same accesscode.

Once an access code has been used to conduct a transaction or establisha connection between the two parts or stations it may be deleted fromthe system or otherwise disabled. This may avoid the risk that theaccess code will be reused by the system.

The plurality of access codes may be generated in any suitable mannerand by any suitable means. The means for generating the access codepreferably is capable of generating non-repeating sequences ofcharacters or numbers. In one form the plurality of codes may begenerated via a pseudo random generator. In another form the pluralityof codes may be generated via a custom designed software program. Thebasis for the software program should be randomness and freecombination. In one form the software program may be a spreadsheet typeprogram wherein a regular grid or pattern of characters or numbers canbe mixed in a controlled manner to produce non-repeating sequences ofcharacters and/or numbers.

The characters/numbers may include Arabic numerals, Roman numerals,letters of the alphabet, Morse codes, etc. in any order or combination.Preferably the access codes are generated independently of or externalto the system such an approach may enhance security of the overallsystem by reducing risks associated with systems in which variable codesare generated internally.

The system of the present invention may include first code storage meansassociated with the accessing part of station of the system, such as anATM terminal, personal computer, mobile telephone or the like. The firstcode storage means is adapted for storing one copy of the plurality ofcodes. The system may include second code storage means associated withthe accessed part or station of the system, such as a bank or otherservice computer system or telephone exchange. The second code storagemeans is adapted for storing a second copy of the plurality of codesidentical to the one copy stored in the first storage means. The firststorage means may be incorporated into or with a transaction card suchas an ATM card, a computer diskette, a smart card or integrated circuitmicrochip or the like. The first storage means may include a passivecarrier such as a magnetic strip or the like or it may include an activecarrier such as the integrated circuit microchip. Because a bankterminal system, computer service provider or telephone exchangetypically will have a large number of users, the second storage meansmay be adapted to store a separate plurality of codes for each user.Each plurality of codes may be stored in the second storage means undera separate address. The address may be identified with a unique identitynumber assigned to each respective user. The identity number may be thatuser's account number or it may be a different number associated withthat user.

It is highly desirable that the last used code be removed or otherwisedisabled from the second code storage means at least, as this willminimize the risk that the same code will be reused in a subsequenttransaction. This task may be performed by the bank or other servicecomputer system. The last used code may also be erased or otherwisedisabled from the first code storage means. This latter task may beperformed in any suitable manner and by any suitable means. In one formthis may be carried out by application of heat or mechanical marking notunlike the manner in which a telephone card is disabled according to itslevel of use.

When a user with an ATM card having a particular identity number, say9876, approaches an ATM terminal to make a transaction, the followingsequence of events may take place:

-   -   (i) The bank computer system requests an unused code from the        plurality of codes stored by the first code storage means, e.g.        the ATM transaction card. The unused code will typically be the        next unused code of the plurality of codes, but the plurality        codes may be used in any predetermined sequence;    -   (ii) The bank computer requests the next unused code of the        plurality of codes stored by the second code storage means under        an address for the ATM card having identity number 9876;    -   (iii) Upon receipt of the respective codes from the first and        second code storage means the bank computer compares the codes        looking for a perfect match;    -   (iv) A perfect match between the two codes is interpreted as a        successful verification of the identity of the user's        transaction card, and card number 9876 is granted permission to        proceed with the transaction;    -   (v) A mismatch between the two codes is interpreted as an        unsuccessful verification of the identity of the user's        transaction card and card number 9876 is denied permission to        proceed with the transaction;

The present invention also provides a method of conducting a transactionor establishing a connection between at least two parts or stations bymeans of an access code, said access code being available to an accessedpart or station at the time of conducting the transaction orestablishing the connection and requiring an identical access code to beprovided to an accessing part or station, said method including thesteps of:

-   -   Making available a plurality of codes to said accessed and said        accessing parts or stations;    -   Selecting, at the time of conducting the transaction or        establishing the connection, one code from said plurality of        codes; and    -   Using said selected code to conduct the transaction or establish        the connection such that no two transactions are conducted or        two connections are established with the same access code.

The access code system of the present invention may be used in place ofan existing or conventional access code system or systems or it may beused in addition to an existing or conventional access code system orsystems to upgrade the security of the latter. The improved systemprovided by the present invention may be incorporated into a newlydesigned code based access system or it may be provided by modifying anexisting system to distinguish access codes according to the presentinvention from prior art codes they will hereinafter be referred to as“secondary” codes.

The system of the present invention may be used to enhance security of adoor opening apparatus, in particular door opening apparatus which makesuse of an electronic key for accessing secure areas such as safes,strong rooms, high security areas or the like. In the latter embodimenta set of secondary security codes according to the present invention maybe loaded to a first code storage means associated with the accessedpart of the system. The accessed part may be a user inaccessible part ofthe door opening apparatus. The first code storage means may include anintegrated circuit microchip, magnetic strip, smart card, computerdiskette or the like. An identical set of codes may be made available tothe accessing part of the system. The accessing part may be a useraccessible part of the door opening apparatus. The accessing part mayinclude an electronic key. The electronic key may include a second codestorage means for storing an identical set of security codes. The secondcode storage means may include a magnetic strip, smart card, integratedcircuit microchip, computer diskette or the like.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Preferred embodiments of the present invention will now be describedwith reference to the accompanying drawings wherein:

FIG. 1 shows a diagrammatic representation of one form of application ofthe present invention to bank terminals;

FIGS. 2A, 2B and 2C show front, rear and cross-sectional viewsrespectively of a dummy ATM card;

FIGS. 3A, 3B and 3C show empty, loaded and cross-sectional viewsrespectively of a carrier strip transfer apparatus;

FIG. 4 shows a cross-sectional views of an ATM card with carrier stripinstalled;

FIG. 5 shows a diagrammatic representation of one form of application ofthe present invention to a mainframe computer system;

FIG. 6 shows a diagrammatic representation of one form of application ofthe present invention to a mobile transceiver; and

FIG. 7 shows a diagrammatic representation of one form of application ofthe present invention to a door opening apparatus.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTIONS

Referring to FIG. 1, there is shown an ATM access card 10 which servesas a carrier for secondary codes according to the present invention. Inaddition to the known magnetic strip (not shown) which carries theaccount number of the client, ATM card 10 includes a carrier strip 11 inwhich are stored secondary codes according to the present invention.Prior to using ATM card 10 at an ATM terminal 12, ATM card 10 isinserted into a dedicated disc drive of a Personal Computer (PC) 13. PC13 is programmed to generate a non-repeating set of 100 secondary codes14 and to write the set of codes 14 into carrier strip 11. An identicalset of 100 codes is sent to data storage module 15 associated with thebank's main computer system 16. The set of codes 14 may optionally besent to code replacement module 17 where they may be held temporarilypending transfer to storage module 15. After the set of codes have beenwritten into carrier strip 11 and storage module 15 or code replacementmodule 17, PC 13 is programmed to delete the code set from its memory.This enhances security of the system by ensuring that no additionalcopies of the code set remain in existence.

ATM card 10 which carries identification serial number 9876 may then beinserted into a (modified) card slot associated with ATM terminal 12.The holder of ATM card 10 may key in his PIN number to commence atransaction and this may continue to provide a primary level of securityas is known in the art. To provide a secondary level of securityaccording to the present invention, main computer 16 sends a request Ato ATM terminal 12 for the first unused code (ABCDEF) from the set 14 of100 codes written into carrier strip 11 associated with ATM card 10.Main computer 16 also sends a request B for the first unused code fromthe identical set of 100 codes stored in data storage module 15 under anaddress for the ATM card carrying identification serial number 9876.

ATM terminal 12 sends reply C to computer 16 including the first unusedcode (ABCDEF) from carrier strip 11 and data storage module 15 sendsreply D including the first unused code stored under the addresscorresponding to ATM card bearing serial number 9876. When computer 16identifies a match between the codes included in replies C and D, itinterprets this as a successful verification of the identity of ATM card10 bearing serial number 9876 and grants permission E to ATM terminal 12to proceed with the transaction.

When computer 16 identifies a mismatch between the codes included inreplies C and D, it interprets this as an unsuccessful verification ofthe identity of ATM card 10 bearing serial number 9876 and deniespermission to ATM terminal 12 to proceed with the transaction. Amismatch between the codes included in replies C and D indicates that anunauthorized penetration of the banking system may have taken place.Instead of barring further transactions in the event of a mismatchbetween the codes included in replies C and D, computer 16 may beprogrammed to request another code set each from ATM terminal 12 anddata storage module 15. Preferably computer 16 is programmed to requestthree further code sets each from ATM terminal 12 and data storagemodule 15. If three consecutive code sets do not match, computer 16 mayreasonably assume that the banking system has been penetrated byunauthorized elements and may bar further transactions of the accountvia the ATM card. Even if two out of three codes match computer 16 maystill bar the transaction. Computer 16 may continue to request codes forverification until it has three consecutive matches, and may then returnATM card 10 to the user but not issue cash.

Computer 16 may advise the user via the screen associated with ATMterminal 12 to contact the local branch of his bank and seek assistancee.g. to have the account number and/or code sets changed. The detectedinstance of potential breach of ATM card security may be recorded andcommunicated to the user immediately via telephone/fax/mail and/or thenext authorized transaction made by the user.

When the holder of the ATM card commences a subsequent transaction,computer 16 sends a request to ATM terminal 12 for the second unusedcode (1234567). This process continues until all 100 secondary codeshave been used up one at a time. When all 100 codes sets have been usedup the user will be advised via ATM terminal 12 to contact his bank tohave the defunct carrier strip 11 replenished with a fresh set of 100codes. Carrier strip 11 may be replenished by rewriting. Alternatively,if the technique used for disabling/deleting used codes has harmed theintegrity of the carrier strip 11, carrier strip 11 may be removed fromthe ATM card and replaced with a fresh carrier strip. The fresh carrierstrip may be supplied to the bank branch from a central location alreadywritten with a new set of 100 codes. The fresh carrier strip may besupplied attached to a blank or dummy card to facilitate handling,programming and transfer of the carrier strip to a customer's ATM card.

Referring to FIGS. 2A-C there is shown a dummy card 20 formed from 0.4mm thick plastics. This is about half the thickness of an ATM card.Fresh carrier strip 21 is attached to the front of dummy card 20 via alayer of adhesive 22. As shown in FIG. 2B, dummy card 20 is perforatedat edges 23 adjacent the perimeter of carrier strip 21 and carrier strip21 is arranged to break away from the main body of dummy card 20. Alocal layer of adhesive 24 overlaying carrier strip 21 is applied to theback of dummy card 20 as shown in FIGS. 2B and 2C. Adhesive layer 24 isprotected by a removable non-stick plastic cover 25.

Fresh carrier strip 21 may be transferred to a customer's existing ATMcard via an apparatus as shown in FIGS. 3A to 3C. Referring to FIG. 3A,the apparatus includes hinged upper and lower panels 26, 27. Upper panel26 includes a recess 28 for receiving an ATM card. The ATM card includesa recess 10A for receiving carrier strip 21 (refer FIG. 4.) Lower panel27 includes a recess 29 for receiving the dummy card 20. Lower panel 27also includes an embossing bar 30 positioned so that it coincides withcarrier strip 21 when dummy card 20 is received in recess 29.

Embossing bar 30 is positioned so that it also coincides with recess 10Ain the ATM card when the latter is received in recess 28 and upper andlower panels 26 and 27 are closed against each other. Referring to FIG.3B, embossing bar 30 in its rest position is below the level of thenon-recessed face of lower panel 27 by the thickness of dummy card 20.Embossing bar 30 rests on see-saw brackets 31, 32. See-saw brackets 31,32 are mounted for pivotal movement about respective pivot points 33,34. The inner ends 35, 36 of brackets 31, 32 abut embossing bar 30. Theouter ends 37, 38 of brackets 31, 32 project beyond the face of lowerpanel 27 such that when upper and lower panels 26 and 27 are closedagainst each other, brackets 31, 32 pivot, lifting embossing bar 30approximately 0.5 mm above its rest position.

In operation an ATM card 10 devoid of its carrier strip is received inrecess 28 and dummy card 20 with carrier strip 21 intact is received inrecess 29 as shown in FIG. 3C. To effect transfer of carrier strip 21from dummy card 20 to ATM card 10, cover 25 is peeled away from adhesivelayer 24 and upper panel 26 is closed firmly against lower panel 27 ofthe apparatus. This caused embossing bar 29 to lift to a position aboutlevel with the non-recessed face of panel 27, breaking perforated edges23 and causing carrier strip 21 to lodge into recess 10A in ATM card 10(refer FIG. 4). Upon opening of the apparatus, transfer of carrier strip21 from dummy card 20 to the customer's ATM card 10 should be complete.

Transfer of carrier strip 21 from dummy card 20 to the customers ATMcard 10 may also be performed manually. This may be done by firstlyremoving the cover 25 from adhesive layer 24 and placing dummy card 20on top of ATM card 10, both in an upright and face up position. The twocards may be held firmly together e.g. by means of adhesive tape appliedto the tops and sides of the cards. The two cards should then be placedon a hard surface such as the edge of a table and an embossing barapproximately equal in dimensions to carrier strip 21 (78 mm×4 mm)placed on the top of carrier strip 21. The embossing bar should then bepressed down firmly with both thumbs. The thumbs may be slid along thelength of the embossing bar until carrier strip 21 breaks away fromdummy card 20 along its perforated edges 23 and is pushed into recess10A in ATM card 10. The adhesive tapes may then be removed and transferof carrier strip 21 to ATM card 10 should be complete.

Each bank branch may hold a large number of dummy cards with attachedreplacement carrier strips. To maintain security of the allocationprocess the customer may select at random a replacement carrier stripfrom a batch of say 1000 replacement strips. When the customer selectshis carrier strip it is affixed to his ATM card and the central bankcomputer is notified of the choice. The central bank computer thenassociates its second copy of the set of codes identical to the chosenreplacement strip with the customer's account or other identificationnumber.

The system shown in FIG. 5 protects a mainframe computer system 40 fromhacking by way of external links to the computer system 40. Security istypically provided in this context by way of a common password for allauthorized users of computer system 40 and optionally another passwordfor individual users. The passwords are usually changed once a week.This allows a hacker who gains access to the password or passwords tocommit repeated break-ins over the period of currency of the password(s)and to gain access to confidential information and corrupt the systemwith unauthorized data or a virus.

The present invention allows operators of computer systems tosubstantially limit risk of random break-ins and to avoid repeatedbreak-in activities.

Referring to FIG. 5 there is shown a personal computer (PC) 41 connectedto computer system 40 via connection 42 such as the internet, and averification module 43. Before access to computer system 40 can begranted verification module 43 must receive a valid code(s) from PC 41.The valid code(s) may include the usual password or passwords andincludes a secondary code according to the present invention. A set ofsecondary codes 44 a may be stored on an authorization diskette 44 whichserves as a carrier for the secondary codes. Diskette 44 is adapted tostore 100 sets of secondary codes. The set of secondary codes 44 a isloaded to diskette 44 via PC 45 belonging to or being under the controlof the owner or operator of computer system 40.

Once it is loaded with the secondary codes 44 a diskette 44 is suppliedvia a secure route to the authorized user of computer system 40. Theauthorized user is obliged to store diskette 44 in a secure andpreferably locked or otherwise restricted location. Diskette 44 willtypically be available for use with a designated PC/terminal i.e. aterminal having a specific E-mail address, unless a roaming authorityhas been granted.

Diskette 44 should only need to be sent to new clients or first timeusers (including replacements for lost, barred and malfunctioning disks)because subsequent replacements codes (i.e. after a current set of 100codes has been used up) can be sent to the user's PC 41 via connection42 after it has been verified. A set of 100 secondary codes identical tothe set loaded to diskette 44 is sent from PC 45 to storage module 46associated with verification module 43. The set of codes may optionallybe sent to code replacement module 47 where they may be held temporarilypending transfer to storage module 46.

When a user requests access to computer system 40 and (optionally) keysin his passwords into PC41, verification module 43 sends a requests toPC41 via connection 42 for the first unused code from the list of 100codes stored on diskette 44. Module 43 also sends a request A for thefirst unused code from the identical set of 100 codes stored in storagemodule 46 under an address specific to PC41. PC41 sends a reply toverification module 43 including the first unused code stored ondiskette 44, and storage module 46 sends reply B to verification module43 including the first unused code stored under the address whichcorresponds to PC41. When verification module 43 identifies a matchbetween the codes received from PC41 and storage module 46 it interpretsthis as a successful verification of the identity of PC41 and grantsaccess to PC41 to connect to computer system 40.

Even if the first set of codes is not immediately deleted after use forany reason, the verification software should be programmed so that itavoids reusing a previously used code. When the user next requestsaccess to computer system 40, verification module 43 sends a request forthe second unused code. This process continues until all 100 secondarycodes have been used up one at a time. Diskette 44 will then be defunctas it has no more verification codes available and must be replenishedor replaced.

In one form a code replacement program may be activated upon positiveverification of an access using the last or 100th code. Upon detecting averification which utilizes the 100th code, code replacement module 47is activated to choose at random a new group of 100 secondary codesstored in module 47 and to download this to diskette 44 via line 48,module 43, line 42 and PC41. During this process an image appears on thescreen of PC41 warning the user not to remove diskette 44 from PC41.Module 47 also loads an identical set of codes to storage module 46. Theverification software may then assign via line 49 the identity of PC41,such as its E-mail address, to the set of codes just loaded to storagemodule 46. Code replacement module 47 may hold a large stock of unusedcode sets (e.g. 1000) ready to be downloaded upon receiving a requestfrom verification module 43.

When verification module 43 identifies a mismatch between the codesreceived from PC41 and module 46 it interprets this as an unsuccessfulverification of the identity of PC41 and denies further access to PC41to connect to computer system 40. A mismatch between the codes receivedfrom PC41 and module 46 indicates that an unauthorized penetration ofthe computer system may have taken place. The user is advised of thisstatus and of the need for increased security/access to PC41 to preventfurther unauthorized activities and/or the need to change passwords,diskette 44 etc.

Instead of barring further access in the event of a mismatch between thecodes, module 43 may be programmed to request another code set each fromPC41 and data storage module 46. Preferably module 43 is programmed torequest a further three code sets each from PC41 and data storage module46. If three consecutive code sets do not match, module 43 mayreasonably assume that the computer system has been penetrated byunauthorized elements and may bar further access to PC41. Even if twoout of three codes match module 43 may still bar access. Module 43 maycontinue to request codes for verification until it has threeconsecutive matches, and only then may grant access to PC41.

The system shown in FIG. 6 protects a mobile transceiver such as acellular telephone from unauthorized use. Security is typically providedin this context by means of an electronic serial number (ESN) whichestablishes the identity and authenticity of an incoming call placedthrough a host transceiver. During the process of registration andactivation of a new cellular telephone, matching sets of ESNs arerespectively placed in the mobile transceiver and in the data bank of amain telephone exchange.

When a call is placed through the mobile transceiver, the transceivertransmits its ESN followed by the telephone number of a recipienttransceiver. The transmitted signal is relayed via a receiving dish tothe data bank of the telephone exchange. The ESN of the mobiletransceiver is then compared to the matching ESN in the databank. When amatch is established, the call is recognized by the telephone exchangeas genuine and is authorized passage to the next stage (where no matchis established between the transceiver ESN and the data bank ESN, thecall is rejected and refused passage through the main exchange). Thetelephone number of the recipient transceiver is then sent by thetelephone exchange to a transmitting tower for transmission to therecipient transceiver.

Referring to FIG. 6, there is shown a host transceiver 50 linked to arecipient transceiver 51 (not shown) via telephone exchange 52 andrespective transceiver stations 53, 54. Before access to recipienttransceiver 51 can be granted, telephone exchange 52 must receive avalid code(s) from host transceiver 50. The valid code(s) may include aconventional ESN and includes a secondary code according to the presentinvention. A set of secondary codes may be stored in an integratedcircuit microchip/smart card (IC) 55 fitted to host transceiver 50.

IC 55 is in addition to the usual ESN integrated circuit microchip/smartcard 56 fitted to host transceiver 50. IC 55 is adapted to store 500sets of secondary codes 55 a. The set of secondary codes 55 a istransferred to IC 55 via PC 57 belonging to or being under control ofthe owner or operator of telephone exchange 52. PC 57 includes adedicated IC writer for this purpose. Once IC 55 is programmed, it issent to a local branch office of the telephone service operator or hisagent for installation to a new subscriber's transceiver or forreplacement of a defunct IC i.e. an IC which has exhausted all of itssecondary codes.

A set of 500 secondary codes identical to the set 55 a stored in IC 55is sent from PC57 to storage module 58 associated with telephoneexchange 52. The set of codes may optionally be sent to code replacementmodule 59 where they may be held temporarily pending transfer to storagemodule 58.

When host transceiver 50 places an outgoing call it transmits its ESNwhich is picked up by transceiver station 53 and relayed to telephoneexchange 52. The transmitted ESN is then compared to the matching ESN inthe data bank of telephone exchange 52. When a match is established theESN is recognized by telephone exchange 52 as legitimate and the call isauthorized passage to the next stage.

According to the present invention telephone exchange 52 sends a requestA to host transceiver 50 via transceiver station 53 for the first unusedcode from the set of 500 codes 55 a stored in IC 55. Telephone exchange52 also sends a request B for the first unused code from the identicalset of 500 codes stored in storage module 58 under an address specificto host transceiver 50. In practice the storage address may beassociated with the unique ESN assigned to host transceiver 50.

Host transceiver 50 sends a reply C including the first unused codestored in IC 55 to telephone exchange 52 and storage module 58 sendsreply D to telephone exchange 52 including the first unused code storedunder the address which corresponds to host transceiver 50. Whentelephone exchange 52, identifies a match between the codes included inreplies C and D, it interprets this as a successful verification of thehost transceiver 50 and allows the telephone number of the recipienttransceiver 51 sent by host transceiver 50, to be transmitted totransceiver station 54 and relayed to recipient transceiver 51.

Even if the first set of codes is not immediately deleted after use forany reason, the verification software should be programmed so that itavoids reusing a previously used code. When the subscriber next placesan outgoing call, telephone exchange 52 sends a request for the secondunused code. This process continues until all 500 secondary codes havebeen used up one at a time. IC55 will then be defunct as it has no moreverification codes available and must be replenished/replaced.

When all 500 codes have been used up (in practice this may be a lessernumber to allow some reserve calls to be made before receiving areplacement for IC55) the telephone exchange can advise the subscriber(e.g. by means of a recorded message following verification of, say, the490th call) to contact his local branch to have the defunct (or soon tobe defunct) IC 55 replaced with a fresh IC. The fresh IC may be suppliedto the branch office already loaded with a new set of 500 codes. Eachbranch office may hold a large number of replacement IC's to maintainsecurity of the allocation process the subscriber may select at random areplacement IC from a batch of, say, a 1000 replacement ICs. When thesubscriber selects his/her IC it may be fitted to his transceiver andthe telephone exchange notified of the choice. The telephone exchangemay then associate its second copy of the set of codes identical to thechosen replacement IC with the subscribers ESN or other identificationnumber.

IC 55 may be located in an easily accessible position in the associatedtransceiver to enable replacement of defunct ICs. In some embodiments IC55 may comprise a smart card. IC 55 also may be integrated with ESN IC56. Typically a transceiver will require modification to accommodateIC55. This may be done by way of a sliding carrier not unlike a smartcard. New transceivers may be constructed with a built-in slot forreceiving IC 55 and/or associated carrier.

Referring to FIG. 7, there is shown a safe/strong room 60. Safe/strongroom 60 includes a code based door opening apparatus according to thepresent invention.

The door opening apparatus includes a first code storage meansassociated with a user inaccessible part of the door opening apparatus.The first code storage means is adapted for storing a set of secondarycodes 61. The first code storage means include a computer diskette 62.The diskette 62 may be adapted to store 100 sets of secondary codes. Theset of secondary codes 62 is loaded to diskette 62 via PC 63.

Once it is loaded with secondary codes 61 diskette 62 is installed tothe user inaccessible part of the door opening apparatus.

PC 63 is used to load an identical set of secondary codes 61 to a seconddiskette 64. Diskette 64 is in possession of the owner of safe/strongroom 60 or other authorized person, who is obliged to store diskette 64in a secure and preferably locked or otherwise restricted location. Whenthe owner/authorized person requires access to safe/strong room 60,diskette 64 serves as an electronic key to activate the door openingapparatus and gain access to safe/strong room 60.

When diskette 64 is inserted into the user accessible part of the dooropening apparatus associated with safe/strong room 60, the door openingapparatus requests the first unused code from the list of 100 codesstored on diskette 62. The door opening apparatus also requests thefirst unused code from the identical set of 100 codes stored in diskette64. When the door opening apparatus identifies a match between the codesreceived from diskette 62 and diskette 64 it interprets this as asuccessful verification of the identity of the electronic key and opensthe door.

Finally, it is to be understood that various alterations, modificationsand/or additions may be introduced into the constructions andarrangements of parts previously described without departing from thespirit or ambit of the invention.

1. A system for verification of user identity, comprising: a serviceprovider's computer system (43); a user's accessing terminal (50) withat least one storage means used for storing; at least one verificationaccess code (14); at least one electronic communication means fordelivering a verification access code; wherein, at least oneverification access code (14) is sent and delivered from the serviceprovider's computer system (43) into the user's mobile transceiver (50);wherein, said at least one code is used to authenticate said at leastone user's identity.
 2. A system as recited in claim 1, wherein, said atleast one access code (14) transmitted is used for the purpose ofverification and authentication of said at least one user's identity. 3.A system as recited in claim 1, wherein, said at least one electroniccommunication means used for delivering said verification access code(14) is selected from a group consisting of an internet connection (42);a wireless network or a wire-line network.
 4. A system as recited inclaim 1, wherein, said accessing terminal is selected from a groupconsisting of a mobile transceiver (50); personal computer (41);automated teller machine terminal
 12. 5. A system as recited in claim 1,wherein, said at least one storage means used for storing said at leastone verification access code (14) is selected from a group consisting ofa an integrated circuit microchip (55, 56); and a smart card (55, 56).6. A system as recited in claim 1, wherein, an initial user verificationusing password or personal identification number precedes the use ofsaid at least one verification access code (14); wherein, said at leastone verification access code (14) and at least one verification messageis downloaded by said user prior to being used to authenticate saiduser's identity to said service provider's computer system (43).
 7. Amethod of verification wherein, at least one verification access code(55 a) is delivered from a service provider's computer system (43) overan internet connection (42) into an accessing terminal (41); wherein,said at least one access code is stored into an integrated circuitmicrochip (55, 56) residing inside the accessing terminal (41); wherein,said at least one access code (55 a) downloaded is used to verify andauthenticate the remote identity of at least one customer over theinternet connection (42) to said service provider's computer system(43); wherein said step of downloading at least one access code isperformed before at least one access to conduct a secure computerizedtransaction is granted.
 8. A method of verification as recited in claim7, wherein, said at least one integrated circuit microchip (55, 56); orsaid at least one smart card (55, 56); resides inside said computerizedaccessing terminal; wherein, the accessing terminal is selected from agroup comprising of: a personal computer terminal (41) and a mobiletransceiver terminal (50).
 9. A method of verification whereinverification access codes delivered from a service provider's computersystem (43) into an accessing terminal (41) are stored in a detachablestorage-memory means (55); wherein, said computerized access codesstored on said detachable storage-memory means (55) are used on anaccessing station comprising a mobile transceiver (50) to authenticate aremote customer's identity over an electronic network 42 to an accessedstation 43 before authorization for access to conduct a securetransaction is granted; wherein, said at least one access code (55 a) isdownloaded by means of an internet connection (42) and stored into saiddetachable storage-memory means (55); wherein, said detachablestorage-memory means (55) is detached and removed from accessingterminal (41) after programming; operably connected to a mobiletransceiver (50) for use; to perform said at least one userverification; wherein, said accessing terminal (41) includes aintegrated circuit microchip writer; wherein, transceiver (50) isadapted with at least port for accommodating the detachablestorage-memory means (55).
 10. A method as recited in claim 9: wherein,said detachable storage-memory means (55) is inserted the mobiletransceiver (50); wherein, said mobile transceiver (50) incorporates atleast one port configured to accommodate or receive said detachablestorage-memory means (55) carrying said at least one verification codeused for performing said at least one authentication for said at leastone customer.
 11. A method as recited in claim 10, wherein saiddetachable storage-memory means (55) is selected from a group consistingof a smart card chip (55, 56); and an integrated circuit microchip (55,56).
 12. A method as recited in claim 10, wherein said accessingterminal (41) is selected from a group consisting of a personal computerterminal (41), an Automated Teller Machine terminal (12) and a mobiletransceiver (50).